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NOTE
DANCING PROMOTIONS, DODGING PREEMPTION,
AND DEFENDING PERSONAS: WHY
PREEMPTING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
DEPRIVES TALENT THE PUBLICITY
PROTECTION THEY DESERVE
Actors sacrifice a lot of privacy when they become the focus of the public eye.
For this and other reasons, they deserve to keep their private lives distinct
from their public image, and they should be handsomely compensated for any
use of their identity.
-Sam Gores'
I. INTRODUCTION
Artists of all trades and talents are driven by the desire, even pas-
sion, for self expression. Whether they express for fame or critical
acclaim, the result is the same: very few artists attain recognizable
identities or marketable personas. Those few who do achieve celebrity
status find that it brings both burdens and benefits. One sizable bur-
den is the trying loss of privacy and tiresome need to constantly ap-
pease the public imagination. On the other hand, a major benefit
exists in the lucrative pecuniary value that may attach to a celebrity's
persona. 2 In most instances, a person's public personality becomes
valuable only after the investment of time, effort, skill, and perhaps
1 Interview with Sam Gores, President of Paradigm Talent and Literary Agency,
Century City, California (Nov. 21, 1997).
2 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
203, 215 (1954); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(taking judicial notice of the widespread commercial exploitation of names, faces,
and reputations of celebrities).
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money,3 so the law strives to protect proprietary claims individuals
have in such economically beneficial publicity interests.
Publicity rights are the state causes of action that protect the
name, voice, likeness, and identity of individuals from defendants us-
ing their identities for a commercial or economic advantage. 4 Plain-
tiffs are generally public figures whose identities have a commercially
exploitable value, 5 but publicity rights protect artists across the board,
from currently unknown actors like Stephen Fleet,6 to the fleet-footed
dance legend, Fred Astaire.7 Some courts threaten to deprive individ-
uals of this identity protection by ruling that federal copyright law
preempts publicity rights granted by the states. This Note addresses
the separate and distinct protections granted both by state right of
publicity laws and federal copyright law.
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion8 expressly protects the commercial value of a person's identity9
by incorporating the right of publicity as an independent component
of unfair competition law, 10 and a majority of states recognize the
right of publicity by means of statute, judicial decision, or both.11 At
3 See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 215-16. For discussion of instances in which an
individual's identity becomes recognizable by accident, luck, or association with a neg-
ative event, see infra note 42.
4 See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983)
("Often considerable money, time, and energy are needed to develop the ability in a
person's name or likeness to attract attention and evoke a desired response in a par-
ticular consumer market.").
5 See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983) (stating that only the identity of public figures and celebrities have a commer-
cially exploitable value); see also Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame:
A Parody Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 97, 120 (1993)
("Although celebrities may not mean exactly the same thing to everyone, they do have
meaning. Celebrities' power to 'sell' commodities with which they are associated
proves that their images mean something to consumers.").
6 A recent decision of a California State Court of Appeals held that federal copy-
right law preempted California from extending right of publicity protection to child-
actor Stephen Fleet for distribution of a film in which Fleet appeared. Fleet v. CBS,
Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996).
7 See Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
9 Id. § 46 cmt. a ("One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's
identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the
rules stated in secs. 48 and 49.").
10 Id. §§ 46-49.
11 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(Banks-Baldwin 1994); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op 1986); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-202, -208 (Michie 1991); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1626 [VOL- 73:5
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
the federal level, copyright law protects the ingenuity, invention, and
investment of a creator's energies. Current federal copyright law, the
product of the Copyright Act of 1976, protects original works of au-
thorship that a creator expresses in a tangible form. It expressly states
that federal law provides the lone rule on copyright issues and
preempts any state law that attempts to offer rights granted by the
1976 Copyright Act.'' Thus, if a right of publicity law of a state offers
rights granted by the 1976 Copyright Act, the federal law will preempt
the state-created cause of action.
A majority of courts, commentators, and legal scholars agree that
the 1976 Copyright Act does not preempt a state's right of publicity
law.'5 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that California's right
of publicity is not preempted by federal law.14 On the other hand, a
decade-old decision by the Seventh Circuit' 5 held that federal copy-
right law preempted a state's right of publicity law. This case threw
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 to .3 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-1-28
(1997); TENN. CODEANN. § 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1995); UTAH CODEANN. § 45-3-1 to -6
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West
1997); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977); Car-
son v. Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415
F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821
F. Supp. 341, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Alleni v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that New York no longer recognizes a distinct publicity right
and only affords protection under its privacy statute); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,
513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
1281 (D. Minn. 1970); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979);
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods. Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982); Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474
N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129
(Wis. 1979).
12 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
13 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Waits v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1988); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220
(2d Cir. 1978); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979); Nimmer, supra note 2,
at 215-16. But see Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996);
David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; ItJust Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal
Preemption, 66 CORNEL L. REv. 673 (1981).
14 SeeWaits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
15 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663
(7th Cir. 1986).
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commentators into a frenzy 16 and left legal observers wondering how
it would affect other circuits' treatment of the issue; but such rulings
were not confined to courts within the Seventh Circuit. Last year a
California State Court of Appeals ruled consistently with the Seventh
Circuit decision and held that federal copyright law preempted Cali-
fornia's right of publicity.
17
Although artists deserve the protection of the law no matter
where they ply their trade, publicity rights attach only to those with a
publicly recognizable identity. Therefore, it is paramount that Cali-
fornia, the queen of cinema and capital of the entertainment enter-
prise, actively and consistently recognizes and protects the rights
artists have in their identities.1 8 Since the Ninth Circuit often serves
as the "Hollywood Circuit,"1 9 issues raised in a case recently decided
by that court2 ° provide a suitable backdrop for discussing whether fed-
eral law preempts state rights of publicity.
In this Note, I focus on the conditions required for federal copy-
right law to preempt state law. Part II familiarizes the reader with the
facts of Astaire v. Best Film & Video,21 which was recently decided by the
Ninth Circuit on grounds distinct from the preemption issue but
whose parties raised insightful preemption arguments nonetheless.
Part III outlines the policy considerations and evolution of the right of
publicity cause of action and, in light of Astaire, I focus on California's
right of publicity law.
In Part IV, I attempt to familiarize the reader with federal copy-
right law, and I focus on the preemption of state law. I also discuss
the impact of several preemption cases from around the country, in-
cluding the recent California Court of Appeals ruling in favor of pre-
emption in Fleet v. CBS, Inc.22 Part V contrasts federal copyright
16 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 2, at 215-16; Shelley Ross Saxer, Note, Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n: The Right of Publicity in Game
Performances and Federal Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L. REV. 861 (1989).
17 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that federal
copyright law preempts California's right of publicity). Fleet has received harsh criti-
cism from leading entertainment attorneys. Telephone Interview with Vincent
Chieffo, Partner, Gipson, Hoffman, & Pancione, Century City, Cal. (Apr. 14, 1997).
18 New York and Tennessee also have extremely active entertainment industries.
19 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting) ("For better or worse we are the Court of Appeals for the
Hollywood Circuit. Millions of people toil in the shadow of the law we make, and
much of their livelihood is made possible by the existence of intellectual property
rights.").
20 See Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
21 Id.
22 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996).
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protection with the right of publicity and outlines why the two provide
independent protection. Finally, in Part VI, I summarize why federal
copyright law alone does not afford celebrities the legal protection
they deserve, and I conclude that the federal Copyright Act of 1976
does not preempt state right of publicity laws.
II. F.cis OF' A,&mE v B-s-s FIm& WDEO
In a case recently decided by the Ninth Circuit,23 the estate of
legendary dancer and film star Fred Astaire brought a right of public-
ity action against a producer of instructional dance videotapes that
contained Astaire's likeness.
Fred Astaire and business partner Chester Casanave started the
Fred Astaire Dance Studios in 1946.24 In 1953, Astaire withdrew from
the business and sold his rights under a contract that granted him a
40-year royalty from the company's revenues while reserving for
Casanave the right to continue the dance instruction business. Pursu-
ant to these agreements, Astaire gave Casanave the license to
franchise dance studios under the "Fred Astaire Dance Studios" trade-
mark and authorized particular uses of the right to market dance in-
structional materials using the name, image, and likeness of Fred
Astaire.2
5
In 1965 the Fred Astaire Dance Studios Corporation changed its
name to Ronby Corporation, and Astaire granted Ronby "a perpetual
exclusive right and license to use . . . the name 'Fred Astaire' in
connection with the conduct and operation of dance studios and
schools and related activities."26 On March 15, 1989, Ronby and the
Best Film and Video Corporation ("Best") entered into an agreement
to co-produce a series of instructional videotapes using the Fred As-
taire Dance Studios' distinctive and proprietary dance curriculum.
Best produced a series of instructional dance videotapes that
ranged in length from 37 to 43 minutes. Each opened with a brief
introduction by a dance studio representative followed by 93 seconds
of film clips taken from two Fred Astaire films, Royal Wedding and Sec-
ond Chorus. The two films were originally under copyright to major
motion picture studios but have long since fallen into the public
domain. 2
7
23 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
25 See id. at 4.
26 Id.
27 See Respondent's Opening Brief at 2, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
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Best produced, distributed, advertised, and marketed the video-
tapes to wholesale distributors and retailers, and made available com-
plete versions of the videotapes (known as "screeners") for advance
viewing by potential buyers.28 As part of its marketing campaign for
the videotapes, Best gave away hundreds of copies of the videotapes to
potential buyers, the media, and others for "promotional" and
"screening" purposes.29 In addition, Best showed the videotapes at a
consumer electronics show in Chicago in the summer of 1989.30 Best
did not obtain permission from Mrs. Astaire or the Estate of Fred
Astaire to utilize the film clips in the videotapes.
31
The jacket of the videotapes identified them under the Fred As-
taire Dance Studios trademark name and contained a quotation from
Astaire regarding the importance of good dance instruction in learn-
ing to dance.3 2 Defendants claimed that all advertising and marketing
materials produced in conjunction with the distribution of the video-
tapes identified themselves only with the trademark "Fred Astaire
Dance Studios.
'33
As Fred Astaire's widow, Robyn Astaire succeeded to all rights in
Fred Astaire's name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness, and per-
sona.34 In that capacity, she sued Best and the owner of Fred Astaire
Dance Studios alleging various claims, including a violation of Califor-
nia's right of publicity.3 5
The district court found Best liable for violating Astaire's right of
publicity and held that federal copyright law does not preempt Cali-
fornia's right of publicity.3 6 In July of 1993, Ronby and Astaire settled
their claims, thus leaving only the right of publicity claims against
28 See id. at 4 (According to Best's president, " It] he purpose of such dissemina-
tion is to give buyers a sense of the quality and content of the videos themselves.").
29 See id. at 5.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 4 n.3 (stating that Best originally asserted a defense based on the
scope of Mrs. Astaire's registration statement but later stipulated that its use of the
film clips was not authorized by Mrs. Astaire).
33 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
34 Mrs. Astaire claimed rights to Fred Astaire's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, and likeness by filing a Registration of Claim under CAL. CIV. CODE § 990
(West 1998).
35 Astaire brought a cause of action under § 990, which provides publicity protec-
tion for deceased celebrities. It is the companion to CAL. Crv. CODE § 3344 (West
1998) which is explained at Part III of this Note. See also Sean Elliott, Note, Some-
thing's Weird in the State of California: How the Right of Publicity Wronged Bettie Page, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (1997).
36 Astaire v. Ronby, CV 90-261 KN (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1991).
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Best.3 7 Best appealed from thatjudgment, and Astaire appealed from
the portion of the judgment holding that the use by Best was not "for
purposes of advertising, or selling, or soliciting purchases of prod-
ucts."3 8 Of relevance to this Note is Best's claim that the district court
erred in finding that California's right of publicity was not preempted
by the federal Copyright Act.
That the Ninth Circuit decided the case on grounds distinct from
the ruling of Astaire is unfortunate both for celebrities who otherwise
are left without legal recourse for the misappropriation of their identi-
ties and for legal scholars, counselors, and courts who desire a logical,
consistent application of the law.
IlI. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Policy Promoting Publicity Rights
The major justification for protecting a celebrity's right of public-
ity stems from a Lockean reverence for the labor a celebrity invests in
his work.39 In his Second Treatise, Locke avers that an individual owns a
property right in his person and the labor of his body.40 Melville Nim-
mer elaborated on Locke's argument in an influential 1954 article by
contending that one who has "long and laboriously nurtured the fruit
37 On January 10, 1994, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and on March 11, 1994, the District Court issued its ruling. In that order the court
made four key findings of fact and law: (1) Best's use of Astaire's likeness as incorpo-
rated in the videotapes in itself constituted a violation of § 990 as a use "on or
in... products, merchandise, goods, or services," (2) Best did not use Astaire's like-
ness in the videotapes for the purposes of advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases
of the videotapes within the meaning of § 990, (3) the First Amendment does not
protect Best's use of Astaire's likeness from a right of publicity claim, and (4) federal
copyright law does not preempt California's right of publicity. Id.
38 Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
39 SeeJoHn LoCKE, THE SECOND TREAISE OF GOVERNMENT 100 (Peter Laslett ed.,
2d ed. 1976) (elaborating a philosophical argument for private property based on the
fruit of one's labors); see also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D.
Minn. 1970) ("A celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice
and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach marketable sta-
tus. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other personal char-
acteristics, is the fruit of his labors, and is a type of property."). But see Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 125, 132 (1993) (questioning whether the right of publicity should even exist at
all); id. at 174 (labeling arguments for broadening the right of publicity as "a high-
class form of special-interest pleading for the star image industry").
40 LOCKE, supra note 39, at 100 (stating that an individual earns "a property
[right] in [her] own person" and thus in the "labor of [her]body").
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of publicity values" should benefit from those values himself.41 Gain-
ing a commercially exploitable value in one's identity does not come
easily, as it requires considerable energy and ingenuity to both achieve
and maintain celebrity status. 42 Thus, since the celebrity spends time,
money, and energy developing a commercially lucrative persona, that
persona is the fruit of the celebrity's labor and deserves the protection
of the law.
43
41 Nimmer, supra note 2, at 216.
42 See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the As-
sociative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1239 (1986) ("Relief for the celeb-
rity whose persona has been appropriated for a commercial endorsement is
supported by the proposition that the celebrity, by dint of effort or luck, has created
in his or her personality a marketable economic value distinguishable from the emo-
tional value of identity.").
Instances do arise where an individual's identity becomes recognizable by acci-
dent, luck, or association with a negative event. For example, the affair between presi-
dential candidate Gary Hart and Donna Rice in 1984 resulted in Ms. Rice becoming a
spokesperson for No Excuses Jeans. Although Ms. Rice arguably exerted less effort
and displayed less talent to achieve her celebrity status than individuals who perform
for a career and she did not necessarily strive to achieve a publicly identifiable per-
sona, Ms. Rice would be entitled to publicity rights in her persona to the extent that it
became marketable or misappropriated in conjunction with future commercial uses.
This protection of her celebrity status would be merited based on her resulting
loss of privacy and other encumbrances that accompany celebrity status. Further-
more, market forces and economic considerations usually limit the duration of celeb-
rity status for accidental celebrities since, unless Ms. Rice continues sleeping with
politicians, public interest in her will probably wane earlier than the status of one who
continually practices, works, and exerts new talents for a public audience.
43 Some scholars question the legitimacy of the celebrity's proprietary interest in
the self. See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 31, 3740 (1989) (remarking that although the celebrity invests time, effort, skill,
and money in developing her image, it does not follow that all of her value is attribu-
table to her labor because her creation occurs in social context and draws upon other
resources, institutions, and technologies); see also RiCHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES:
FILM STARS AND SOCIETY (1986) (arguing that the consumers and the producers make
a celebrity image a unique phenomenon); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain,
44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 155-58 (1981) (questioning the reasoning that the
celebrity needs to have control over her identity through exclusive property rights in
order to protect her commercial value and expressing concern that such a right is
encroaching upon the "public domain").
It might also be argued that an entertainer's initial salary is sufficient to compen-
sate the artist for his or her work, but salary compensates an individual for his talent
and commercial worth at the time certain work is done and does not compensate the
individual for future unconsented-to uses of his identity.
For example, Jennifer Beals was paid for her portrayal of a struggling dancer in
the film FLASHDANCE (Paramount Pictures Corp. 1983). Beals was paid at the rate of
her unknown identity at the time she played the role, but her persona became more
recognizable after that role. Thus, her salary for that one work would not compensate
1632 [VOL- 73:5
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Most courts and commentators define the right of publicity as a
form of intellectual property,44 so the celebrity should have exclusive
control of his or her right of publicity. Using a celebrity's persona for
the unauthorized commercial gain of another compares to pirating
the celebrity's product,45 so recognizing a right of publicity in one's
identity becomes the most certain way of protecting celebrities from
unauthorized commercial exploitation. 46 Thus, protecting a celeb-
rity's persona affords protection against businesspersons and the like
improperly reaping rewards from the hard work and endeavors the
artist has sown. A final reason to protect the celebrity's identity is to
grant the artist exclusive control of his or her persona in order to
protect consumers from possible misrepresentation, deception, and
false endorsements.47
Attaining a commercial value in one's identity requires trading
one's personal life and privacy for the relentless cravings of the public
imagination. The right of publicity grants the creative individual an
ownership interest in his or her intangible name, likeness, or identity.
Furthermore, protection of publicity rights rewards those in the pub-
lic arenas for their hard work and personal sacrifices48 and encour-
her for a sweatshirt company using the familiar shoulder-exposed pose of Beals from
the film.
Furthermore, the FRashdance role may have been as much a vexation as a blessing.
Beals, an advocate of independent films, does not necessarily want to be known solely
for her ultra-commercial role as an '80s dancer, so she must have the ability to pre-
clude others from the unconsented use of her persona. Salary is simply not sufficient
to accomplish these goals and provide such protection. Telephone Interview with
Erin O'Donell, Assistant to Jennifer Beals (Apr. 3, 1997).
44 See Pemberton, supra note 5, at 113 n.56 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARThY, TiH
RIGHTS OF PUBLIcITY AND PRIvAcy § 10-7 to -8 (1993)).
45 SeeAmerican Econ. Ins. Co. v. Reboans, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(stating that using an individual's persona for the unauthorized commercial gain of
another compares to stealing another's product and passing it off as coming from the
misappropriator's source).
46 Pirating another's product is usually not unlawful, absent passing it off as one's
own. See Sears v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Nonetheless, infringing on public-
ity rights involves misappropriating the celebrity's persona in such a manner as to
create confusion that the celebrity endorses the product in question. See James M.
Left, Not for Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity,
11 U. MiAmi ENT. & SPORTS L. Rrmv. 321, 372 (1994).
47 See, e.g., Lisa A. Lawrence, The Right of Publicity: A Research Guide, 10 HASTiNGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 143, 369-77 (1987) (discussing intellectual property rights);
Madow, supra note 39, at 228-36 (analyzing the rationale behind the consumer pro-
tection argument for publicity rights).
48 For example, although Laurence Fishburne had been acting since long before
doing Apocalypse Now in the mid-1970s, it was not until the 1990s with films such as
Boyz in the Hood, What's Love Got to Do with It, and Searching for Bobby Fisher that he
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ages those with unusual talent to endure the hardships and
humiliation of their occupation. 49 Thus, the celebrity deserves the
protection, security, and many advantages, economic or otherwise,
provided by the right of publicity.
B. Nature and Scope of California's Right of Publicity
The modem right of publicity originated as an element of the
right of privacy50 but has since evolved into a distinct cause of action
recognized in the majority ofjurisdictions in the United States.5 ' The
right of privacy is rooted in a law review article written over a century
ago by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren,52 and the landmark
decision of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.53 then
allowed the transition from the right of privacy to the right of public-
ity. Haelan held that, "in addition to and independent of the right of
privacy... [a celebrity] has a right in the publicity value of his photo-
graph .... This right might be called a 'right of publicity."54
achieved mega-star status. Interview with Sam Gores, Laurence Fishburne's Agent,
Century City, California (Nov. 21, 1997).
49 See Elliott, supra note 35, at 630.
50 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (stating that four
torts comprise the right of privacy: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude, or into his private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff, (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye, and (4) appropriation, for defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff s name or like-
ness-this fourth tort has evolved into the right of publicity).
51 See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(Banks-Baldwin 1997); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op 1986); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-202 to -208 (Michie 1991); N.Y. Crv. RiGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1-.3 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-28 (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. §47-25-1101 to -1108 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §45-3-1 to -6 (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205,
1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp.
341, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.NJ.
1981); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for
Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods. Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982);
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
52 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193 (1890).
53 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
54 Id. at 868.
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A year later, Professor Melville B. Nimmer 55 wrote an influential
article advocating the adoption of a property-based right of publicity.
The right of publicity doctrine progressively gained widespread ac-
ceptance in numerous jurisdictions56 as the United States Supreme
Court recognized the right of publicity as a valid cause of action in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
57
In 1971, the California legislature passed Civil Code § 3344 to
protect against misappropriation of one's persona. It holds any per-
son who uses another's name, photograph, or likeness for advertising
purposes without the other person's consent liable for any injury sus-
tained.58 To fulfill the statutory cause of action, therefore, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant knowingly used the plaintiff's
identity and did so for purposes of advertising or soliciting purchases.
Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's use directly
relates to that commercial purpose.
55 Nimmer, supra note 2, at 203.
56 See, e.g., Carson, 698 F.2d at 836 (holding that an intentional appropriation of
another's identity for "commercial exploitation" violates the right of publicity); Zim v.
Western Publ'g Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging that embod-
ied within the right of privacy is the "right to control the use of [one's own] name for
commercial purposes"); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,
825 (9th Cir. 1974) (granting "legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest
in his own identity"); Cepeda, 415 F.2d at 1206 (stating that it is settled law that a
person "has a valuable property right in his name, photograph and image"); Estate of
Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1.359 (extending the right of publicity to fiction in the form of
theatrical imitations where the end result was commercial exploitation of the public
figure and where the imitation "contribute [d nothing] of substantial value to soci-
ety"); Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282 (holding "that a celebrity has a legitimate pro-
prietary interest in his public personality.., embodied in his name, likeness, statistics
and other personal characteristics"); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Ina,
296 S.E.2d at 705 (extending the right of publicity afforded entertainers and public
officials to "public figures" and holding that such a right "survives the death of its
owner and is inheritable and devisable"); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (App. Div. 1977) (finding a television commercial's unfair and
deceptive imitation of a person's public personality as violating his right to publicity).
But see Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 (holding that the right to exploit name and likeness
must be exercised by individual during his lifetime); Stephano v. News Group Publica-
tions, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (refusing to recognize publicity right as
separate from privacy-right).
57 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
58 California's right of publicity statute was amended in 1984 and currently states,
"Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner.., for purposes of advertising or selling.., without such
person's prior consent.., shall be liable for any'damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof." CAL. Cry. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1998).
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Recovery for misappropriation of name or likeness under Califor-
nia Civil Code § 3344 does not provide the exclusive means of protect-
ing a person's identity from unauthorized commercial appropriation.
The statute expressly states, "l[t] he remedies provided for in this sec-
tion are cumulative and shall be in addition to any others provided for
by law." Thus, § 3344 complements, rather than codifies, the common
law approach to misappropriation.5 9
California authoritatively recognized a common law right of pub-
licity in Eastwood v. Superior Court,60 in which movie legend Clint East-
wood alleged that the tabloid paper National Enquirer misappropriated
his name and likeness. He stated claims under both statutory and
common law misappropriation, and the Eastwood court delineated
four elements required for infringement of the right of publicity: "(1).
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2). the appropriation
of the plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commer-
cially or otherwise; (3). lack of consent; and (4). resulting injury."
'61
Thus, an action at common law in California presents a less oner-
ous burden than an action under California Civil Code § 3344(a)
since the plaintiff need prove neither a knowing use of his persona
nor a direct connection between the use and a commercial purpose.
62
Another distinction between the California statutory and common law
approaches concerns the scope of the protection. A Ninth Circuit de-
cision expanded the common law right of publicity beyond the statu-
tory confines of an individual's actual name or likeness to protect
even the evocation of a celebrity's persona from any unauthorized
exploitation. 63
59 Additionally, id. § 990 is the companion statute to § 3344 for deceased individ-
uals. Section 990 formed the basis for the cause of action in Astaire, and its applica-
tion in that context is discussed at supra Part II and infra Part V(D) of this Note.
60 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
61 Id. at 347, quoted in Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d
639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995).
62 Despite the more rigorous standards of § 3344, the statutory cause of action
provides for the recovery of attorney's fees for the successful plaintiff, whereas the
common law does not. As a result, plaintiffs will bring both statutory and common
law causes of action.
63 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)
("The right of publicity does not require that appropriation of identity be accom-
plished through particular means to be actionable.").
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IV. THE COPcRIG-r AcT OF 1976 AND T RIGHT OF PUBLICrIY
A. Policy Underlying Copyight Law
Since the early 1550's English copyright was a private law con-
cept, called the stationer's copyright, that was used as an instrument
of both monopoly and press control. In 1710 the Statute of Anne
64
was enacted to ensure that the statutory copyright would be used for
neither purpose, 65 and it led to the end of the stationer's company
publishing monopoly and almost certainly provided the basis of the
intellectual property clause of the United States Constitution.6
6
The modem copyright promotes a system where the grant of
rights to authors promotes creativity and benefits public welfare. 67
The Supreme Court has recognized this rationale by stating, "[tihe
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.'"68
More recently, the Court has stated, "[t]he monopoly privileges
that Congress may authorize ... [are] intended to motivate the crea-
tive activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special re-
ward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."69 Thus, the
purpose of copyright is to allow the individual creator a temporary
monopoly over the subject matter of his or her tangible creation in
order to foster the inventions and ingenuity of creators. The right of
publicity, on the other hand, exceeds that by granting the creative
individual an ownership interest in his or her intangible name, like-
ness, or identity. Therefore, the goals and purposes are similar, but
they are not equivalent.
64 8 Anne, ch. 21 (1710).
65 See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719, 784-85
(1989).
66 See Lyman Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 223, 228 (1966); Paul Heald, Federal IntellectualProperty Law and the Economics
of Preemption, 76 IowA L. REv. 959, 963 (1991).
67 See Heald, supra note 66, at 959.
68 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
69 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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B. Federal Preemption of Analogous Rights
State laws are subject to preemption under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution 70 if the state law "actually conflicts
with a valid federal statute" or "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress. ' 7 1 Furthermore, Congress, when it acts within constitutional
limits, is empowered to preempt state laws when it states so in express
terms.72 The intellectual property clause of the United States Consti-
tution expressly grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings.
73
Thus, this clause entities Congress to enact legislation governing
all "writings," and the United States Supreme Court defines writings
"to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor. '74 Therefore, preemption of state publicity rights
is ultimately controlled by the intellectual property clause of the
United States Constitution which grants Congress the power to enact
legislation governing all "physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor."
75
The relationship between state laws and federal intellectual prop-
erty laws was examined in several Supreme Court decisions that pre-
ceded the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. In Sears Roebuck, Inc.
v. Stiffel Co.76 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,77 the Court
held that a state's unfair competition law cannot prohibit the copying
of an article that is not entitled to protection under federal patent law.
According to the Court, "[t] o allow a State by use of its law of unfair
competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too
slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block
off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to
the public."
78
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases refined and elucidated the
approach adopted in Sears and Compco. Federal patent law was held
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
71 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (citations omitted).
72 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1986).
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
75 Id.
76 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
77 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
78 Sears Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
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not to preempt a state's trade secret laws in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron
Corp.7 9 The Court examined the objectives of both patent and trade
secret laws and concluded that the two were not inconsistent.
While the trade secret laws protected items such as customer lists
that would not be considered patentable, the Court held that Con-
gress had "left the area unattended" with respect to such nonpatent-
able subject matter.80 The existence of another form of "incentive to
invention" was deemed not to disturb the patent policy of encourag-
ing the creation of new products and processes. 8' The Court thus
concluded that "[until] Congress takes affirmative action to the con-
trary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets."8 2
This same approach was employed by the United States Supreme
Court in Goldstein v. California,83 which rejected a preemption chal-
lenge to a state criminal statute that prohibited the unauthorized du-
plication of sound recordings. In resolving the issue, the Court held
that the Constitution does not preclude states from granting copy-
rights and does not vest such authority exclusively in the federal gov-
ernment.8 4 Thus, in seeking to determine whether federal copyright
law preempts right of publicity laws of the states, courts must deter-
mine whether Congress has taken "affirmative action contrary" to the
common law right of publicity.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly prohibits
states from legislating in the area of copyright law. It provides:
On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
the copyright as specified by §106 ... are governed exclusively by
this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes
of any State.
8 5
Section 301 may be broader than pre-1978 law since, for instance, it
abolished common law copyright altogether, whereas the predecessor
act did not express that contention and instead relied on the
supremacy clause for the distinction. Nonetheless, Professor Nimmer
has observed, and courts have agreed,8 6 that the scope of preemption
under § 301 of the 1976 Act is basically comparable to that under the
79 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 493.
82 Id.
83 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
84 Id.
85 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
86 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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1909 Act as interpreted by Goldstein.87 In Nimmer's view, § 301 merely
codified Goldstein with respect to works published before January 1,
1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act. Under this interpretation,
the 1976 Act's preemption provision could be applied to pre-1978
publications and preempt plaintiffs from bringing many actions under
state law.
8 8
Since § 301 provides that the federal copyright law preempts "all
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106," the 1976 Copyright Act preempts a state cause of action that
meets three conditions: (1) equivalence to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright (2) in a work of authorship that
is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and (3) within the subject
matter of copyright.89
The House Report on the 1976 Act declares that § 301's preemp-
tive principle "is intended to be stated in the clearest and most une-
quivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline
areas between State and Federal protection."90 Although Congress'
preemptive purpose is clear, the language of § 301 is not. Dispute
exists as to the meaning of two of § 301 (a) 's three conditions for pre-
emption-that the state right be equivalent to copyright, and that the
subject matter of the state right come within the subject matter of
copyright. Some confusion also surrounds § 301 (b)'s exclusion of
certain rights from preemption. 91
1. Equivalent Rights
The first condition required for preemption under § 301 (a) is
that the state right at issue be a "legal or equitable" right that is
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
87 1 MELVILLE H. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.01 [B] at
1-9 n.31 (1997); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RE-
LATED STATE DOCTRINES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLEcTuAL PROP-
ERTY, 802-03 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that preemption of state law publicity rights
would seem to be governed by Goldstein which held that categories of expression not
listed in the Copyright Act were eligible for state protection because Congressional
silence was not to be interpreted as a prohibition on protection).
88 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
89 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 88, at 802-03.
90 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5748.
91 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 88, at 803-04.
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copyright as specified by section 106."92 Section 106 states the exclu-
sive rights in copyrighted works as follows:
[T] he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following:
to reproduce the copyrighted work... ;
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
to distribute copies .. of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
... to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
... to display the copyrighted work publicly.93
Thus, a state right will be preempted if it attaches to a tangibly fixed
work of authorship coming within the subject matter of copyright and
is equivalent to the right to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative
works based upon the work, to distribute copies of the work publicly,
to perform the work publicly, or to display the work publicly.94 A state
law right is equivalent to copyright for the purposes of §301 if (1) the
right encompasses conduct coming within the scope of one or more
of § 106's exclusive rights, and (2) if applicable state law requires the
plaintiff to prove no more than the elements that the Copyright Act
requires for proof of infringement of one or more of § 106's five ex-
clusive rights.
95
a. State Rights within General Subject Matter of Copyright
The equivalence of state laws in § 301 are measured against "the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106."96 The "general scope of copyright" means the full scope
that Congress could have described for any particular right97 and is
met when the work of authorship being copied "[falls] within the am-
bit of Federal protection."98 Thus, under the general scope require-
ment, § 301 "preempts only those state law rights that 'may be
92 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
93 Id. § 106.
94 See id. § 301.
95 See GoLDsTIN, supra note 88, at 803-04.
96 H.R. RmP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659,
5748. Also, "[t]he preemption of rights under State Law is complete with respect to
any work coming within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive
rights given the work under the bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights
in the work might have been." Id. at 5747.
97 See GoLDsTEN, supra note 88, at 805-06.
98 Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the
exclusive rights' provided by federal copyright law."99
For example, the general scope of copyright includes § 106(4)'s
exclusive right to perform a work, so any state right that prohibits per-
formance will be considered an equivalent right. Although § 106(4)
limits the right to public performances, a state law that prohibited
private performances as well would come within the general scope of
the right because the state right would fall within the general ambit of
the performance right.10 0 Thus, the state law would be preempted.10 1
b. State Rights Containing No Extra Elements
A state right is not equivalent to copyright, and thus is not subject
to preemption, if the state cause of action contains an operative ele-
ment that is absent from the cause of action for copyright infringe-
ment.10 2 Thus, if an extra element is "required instead of or in
addition to acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, or dis-
play, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the
right is not within the general scope of copyright and is not
preempted."'
03
As stated above, California's common law right of publicity re-
quires the elements of defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity, ap-
propriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage,
lack of consent, and resulting injury.10 4 Furthermore, California's
statutory cause of action requires the additional elements of the de-
99 Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (cit-
ing Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200).
100 Nonetheless, a state law addressing solely private performances arguably would
not constitute a right within the general subject matter of federal copyright law.
101 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 88, at 804-05.
102 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
claims are not preempted by federal copyright statute as long as they "contain ele-
ments, such as an invasion of personal rights .. . that are different in kind from
copyright infringement" and that the unauthorized commercial use of one's identity
is an invasion of a "personal property right," different in kind than copyright infringe-
ment); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5748.
103 H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748
("The evolving common law rights of 'privacy,' publicity,' and trade secrets.., would
remain unaffected [by § 301 and federal preemption] as long as the causes of action
contain elements.., that are different in kind from copyright infringement."); see also
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); MELVILLE
H. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.10[B] at 1-11 (1978).
104 SeeMontanav. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983)).
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fendant knowingly using plaintiff's persona and the existence of a di-
rect connection between the use and a commercial purpose.10 5 Thus,
since the state right of publicity cause of action, in addition to being
infringed by reproduction, distribution, or display, also requires a
minimum demonstration that the defendant profited by injuring the
plaintiff's intangible, publicly recognizable identity, the right of pub-
licity requires extra elements beyond those of copyright law, and
therefore evades preemption. Furthermore, as stated by the Second
Circuit and the Southern District of New York, the exploitation of a
celebrity's name and image during his lifetime creates an "intangible
property right' u0 6 that "is not 'equivalent' to a copyright and requires
elements distinct from a copyright violation suit.'
u0 7
Thus, state rights that require elements beyond those required
for infringement of copyright are not preempted. The right of public-
ity is such a law.
c. State Rights Specifically Enumerated as Exempt from
Preemption Under the Original Form of the Copyright
Act of 1976
The drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act originally included several
examples of states' laws that would not be preempted by § 301,108 but
105 Despite the more rigorous standards of § 3344, the statutory cause of action
provides for the recovery of attorney's fees for the successfid plaintiff, whereas the
common law does not. As a result, plaintiffs will bring both statutory and common
law causes of action.
106 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978).
107 Factors Etc., 496 F. Supp. at 1100.
108 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5748 (stating that § 301(b) (3), as submitted to Congress in 1965, exempted activities
violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by § 106, including breaches of contract, breaches of
trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing
off and false representation). In the version that went to the floor of the House in
1976, § 301 (b) (3) included three more examples of exempted state doctrines-tres-
pass, conversion, and "rights against misappropriation not equivalent to any of such
exclusive rights [within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106]." Id.
According to the 1976 House Report, "[m]isappropriation is not necessarily synony-
mous with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of action labeled as 'misappropri-
ation' is not preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 nor on a right equivalent thereto." Id.
This change departs from the position that the House Report took on misappro-
priation in the 1965 bill. According to that report, "where the cause of action involves
the form of unfair competition, commonly referred to as misappropriation, which is
nothing more than copyright protection under another name, § 301 is intended to
have preemptive effect." Id.
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a last minute amendment from the floor of the House removed all of
the state law examples listed in § 301.109
The amendment striking the state law examples leaves some
doubt about the continued relevance of these examples in construing
§ 301's reference to "equivalent" state doctrines. However, courts
should refer to these doctrines as examples of un-preempted state
laws since in one form or another the examples had been associated
with § 301 from the beginning, and the extra elements test apparently
underlay the drafter's selection of these deleted examples.
2. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
Section 301's second requirement for preemption of state law is
that the state right be in "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression." Statutory copyright does not extend to
works that have not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression, so
unfixed works are left to the states. In contrast to copyright protec-
tion for expressions reduced to a tangible form, the product at issue
in a right of publicity case is an individual's intangible persona.110
Stating that Congress considered the right of publicity "to be immune
from preemption," Professor Nimmer asserts that "[invasion] of pri-
vacy and defamation may sometimes occur by acts of reproduction,
109 The amendment was evidently prompted by a letter from the Justice
Department:
While misappropriation is almost certain to nullify preemption, any of the
cause of action listed in paragraph (3) following the phrase 'as specified by
§ 106' may be construed to have the same effect. For example, a court could
construe the copyright of an uncopyrighted published book to be an inva-
sion of the author's right to privacy, i.e., the right to keep the control of the
publication of his book privately to himself.
Quoted in Henry David Fetter, Copyright Revision and the Preemption of State "Misappro-
priation" Law: A Study in Judicial and Congressional Interaction, 25 BuLL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y, USA 367, 423 (1978).
Discussion of the amendment on the House floor clouded the amendment's
meaning as its sponsor suggested that the amendment merely intended to subject
misappropriation doctrine to preemption and a subcommittee member responded
that the amendment would leave misappropriation and the other cited examples of
state law untouched. When the amendment's sponsor subsequently acceded to this
understanding, the subcommittee chair stated that the amendment would in fact pre-
empt misappropriation doctrine and possibly other cited state doctrines as well. 122
CONG. REc. 32105 (1976) (statements of Reps. Seiberling and Railsback).
110 See Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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distribution, performance, or display, but the essence of those torts
does not lie in such acts."
1
3. Within the Subject Matter of Copyright
Section 301's third requirement for preemption is that the work
of authorship subject to the state right must "come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103." Interest-
ingly, neither § 102 nor § 103 defines the "subject matter of
copyright.""n
2
Section 102 (a) only defines copyright subject matter as "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression""13
and lists eight categories of "works of authorship." Section 102(b) pro-
vides that "copyright protection for an original work of authorship
does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work,"" 4 and § 103 adds only that the subject matter of copyright
specified by § 102 includes compilations and derivative works." 5
Thus, § 301's subject matter test provides an interesting interplay
between sections 301 (a) and 102(b) since it could either be under-
stood that § 102(b) says that procedures, processes, and similar ideas
are not the subject matter of copyright, or that these elements come
within the scope of copyright subject matter but that the Act with-
holds protection from them. The first interpretation would allow
111 NIMMER, supra note 104, § 1.10[B] at 1-13 and n.49; see also Factors, Etc., 496 F.
Supp. at 1099.
112 GoLDSTEIN, supra note 88, at 809.
113 Section 102 lists the eight categories of authorship as follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recording; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
114 Id. § 102(b).
115 Id. § 103.
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states to protect procedures, processes, and similar ideas, but the sec-
ond interpretation would prohibit states from protecting these ele-
ments, if fixed, through rights equivalent to copyright.1 16
Thus, the following conclusions can be made concerning § 301
and federal preemption: (1) a state law which protects subject matter
not listed in 17 U.S.C. sections 102(a) or 103(a) is not preempted,
(2) a state law may only protect subject matter listed in § 102(a) by
requiring the plaintiff to prove the additional elements of an in-
dependent cause of action, and (3) a state law which protects subject
matter listed in § 102(a) without requiring proof of additional ele-
ments is preempted whether it extends protection which is broader,
narrower, or the same as extended under federal law.117 These con-
clusions are consistent with the language of § 301, its legislative his-
tory, and the goals of copyright law.
V. INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COPYRIGHT AND STATE RIGHT OF
PuBLIcry LAWS
A. The United States Supreme Court
Many courts and commentators have addressed the issue of po-
tential preemption of the right of publicity. The United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting.1 18 Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed fifteen-
second "human cannonball" acts. A freelance reporter videotaped
Zacchini's act, and the video clip of Zacchini's entire performance was
aired on the news.119 Zacchini alleged that the broadcast of his entire
act was an unlawful appropriation of his property.120
The Ohio Supreme Court applied Ohio's state law based on
Zacchini's "right to publicity value of his performance"12' and ruled
against Zacchini based on a First Amendment right to broadcast the
performance.122 The United States Supreme Court found no impedi-
ment to Ohio providing Zacchini with the "right to publicity value of
his performance"' 23 and went on to state, "[t]he Constitution does
not prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to
116 See GoLDSTIN, supra note 88, at 809.
117 See Heald, supra note 66, at 994.
118 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
119 Id. at 564.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 565.
122 Id. at 566-67.
123 Id. at 565.
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protect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the produc-
ion of this type of work."'12
4
Furthermore, the Zacchini Court, citing the language of Kewanee
Oil, stated, "States may hold diverse viewpoints... in protecting intel-
lectual property relating to the subject matter of copyright. The only
limitafiofi' on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this
area passed by Congress .... u1 2
Thus, although the 1976 Copyright Act was not yet in effect, the
Zacchini Court expressly mentioned the possibility of federal preemp-
tion, yet held that the state right of publicity was not preempted by
federal law.
B. Calfornia and Ninth Circuit Courts
Two years after Zacchini, the Supreme Court of California heard
the case of Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,126 in which the heirs of Bela
Lugosi claimed that Universal Pictures had misappropriated Lugosi's
likeness by licensing the "uniquely individual likeness and appearance
of Bela Lugosi in the role of Count Dracula" 27 without Lugosi's or his
heirs' consent.
As in Zacchini, the Lugosi case preceded the applicability of the
1976 Copyright Act, and, although the majority opinion did not ad-
dress the preemption issue, ChiefJustice Bird's dissent indicated that
congressional action had not preempted the recognition of the com-
mon law right of publicity.' 28 Chief Justice Bird adopted Goldstein's
definition of a writing as "any physical rendering of the fruits of crea-
tive intellectual or aesthetic labor" 29 and then stated:
The intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of public-
ity simply does not constitute a writing. That interest may be valua-
ble due to the individual's creative intellectual labors, but the
publicity value generated by these labors is not focused in a "physi-
cal rendering." To conclude that the right of publicity is subject to
congressional regulation under the copyright clause is to find that
not only an author's writings, but also his mind, are subject to such
control. Such a position is untenable. Thus, congressional action
124 Id at 577.
125 Id. at 577-78 n.13 (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicorn Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479
(1974)).
126 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
127 Id. at 427.
128 Id. at 448.
129 Id. (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)).
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has not preempted the recognition of common law protection for
the right of publicity. 13 0
Finally, as if there could be a more straightforward means of stating
that federal copyright law does not preempt the state right of public-
ity, Chief Justice Bird stated, "Any doubt on this issue was removed
by... Zacchini .... If federal copyright law does not preclude a state
from granting protection to an uncopyrighted performance, a fortiori
the recognition of common law protection for the proprietary interest
in one's name and likeness is immune from such attack."13 1 Thus,
although the majority opinion of the California Supreme Court did
not address the preemption issue, Chief Justice Bird's dissent indi-
cated that congressional action had not preempted the recognition of
the common law right of publicity.
The Ninth Circuit has affirmatively stated in two published opin-
ions, and one unpublished decision, that California's right of publicity
is not preempted by federal copyright law. In Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 1 32 Bette Midler, a well-known recording artist, sued Ford Motor
Company for misappropriating her likeness and infringing on her
right of publicity after the car manufacturer used an impersonator of
Midler's voice to sing one of her songs in the background of a car
commercial. The defendants claimed, among other things, that Cali-
fornia's right of publicity was preempted by federal copyright law, but
the Ninth Circuit rejected copyright preemption because a voice is
not a subject matter of copyright. The court, correctly considering a
voice to be something inextricably linked to the intangible proprietary
right of one's identity and distinct from what can be protected suffi-
ciently by copyright law, stated, "[a] voice is not copyrightable. The
sounds are not 'fixed.' What is put forward as protectible here is
more personal than any work of authorship" 133 for "[a] voice is as
distinctive and personal as a face."'
13 4
Thus, since the elements of identity and likeness that are pro-
tected by the right of publicity do not fall within the subject matter of
federal copyright law, the federal law does not preclude a celebrity
from recovering for an infringement on his or her publicity rights.
Four years later, in a very similar fact pattern, the Ninth Circuit again
held that California's right of publicity was not preempted by federal
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
133 Id. at 462.
134 Id. at 463.
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copyright law. In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,' 35 singer Tom Waits sued a
snack food manufacturer following the broadcast of a radio commer-
cial which featured a vocal performance imitating Waits' "raspy, grav-
elly singing voice."'
3 6
In defending the use of the impersonator's voice in their adver-
tisements, the defendants argued that federal copyright law pre-
empted California's right of publicity law. The Ninth Circuit Court,
holding that the right of publicity was not preempted, stated:
Waits' claim.., is for infringement of voice, not for infringement of
a copyrightable subject such as sound recording or musical compo-
sition. Moreover, . . . "[t]he evolving common law rights of 'pri-
vacy,' 'publicity,' and trade secrets ... remain unaffected [by the
preemption provision] as long as the causes of action contain ele-
ments, such as the invasion of personal rights ... that are different
in kind from copyright infringement." Waits' voice misappropria-
tion claim is one for invasion of a personal property right: his right
of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in his
voice.
137
The court then elaborated that the focus of both Waits and Midlerwas
whether the defendants had misappropriated Waits' voice itself and
not simply its style and whether Waits' voice was known widely enough
to give him a protectible right in its use. The court held, "These ele-
ments are 'different in kind' from those in a copyright infringement
case challenging the unauthorized use of a song or recording. Waits'
voice misappropriation claim, therefore, is not preempted by federal
copyright law."' 38 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
Midler that California's right of publicity is not preempted by federal
copyright law.
In an unpublished decision in Wendt v. Host Internationa4'3 9 the
Court stated up front that the right of publicity is not preempted. In
that case, the defendants implemented animatronic figures of actors
George Wendt 40 and John Ratzenberger of the television show
135 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
136 Id. at 1097.
137 Id. at 1100 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5748).
138 Id. at 1100.
139 No. 93-56318, 9-56510, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1315 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995).
140 Although George Wendt is best known to television audiences as the unforget-
table Norm Peterson from Cheers, his film experience includes Guilty by Suspicion,
Fletch, Spice Worl4, Rupert's Land, and the recently completed Outside Providence, star-
ring Alec Baldwin and Hollywood newcomer Shawn Hatosy.
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Cheers14 1 in airport bars throughout the country. The actors sued for
appropriation of their identities in the design of the figures. The
Wendt decision was not published which is unfortunate because the
Court provided a cogent approach and instructive language on the
preemption issue:
At the outset we wish to make it clear that this is not a preemption
case. Plaintiffs' causes of action are not preempted by federal copy-
right law .... [T]he torts at issue require the proof of additional
elements beyond those essential to show copyright infringement.
For example, both section 3344 and the common law right of pub-
licity tort require proof that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
'likeness' or 'identity' was commercial (i.e., connected with selling
or promoting a product), whereas copyright infringement occurs
with any unauthorized copying of the protected material.' 42
Thus, in accordance with Waits and Midler, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the right of publicity was not preempted. Although the
Ninth Circuit appears to establish that federal law does not preempt
the right of publicity, California state courts and lower district courts
within the Ninth Circuit have found preemption in certain instances.
For example, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California held that federal copyright law preempted California's
right of publicity in Motown Record Corporation v. George A. Hormel &
C0.143
In that case, which predated Midler and Waits, Jobete Music Com-
pany owned the copyright to the musical composition "Baby Love"
which was recorded by The Supremes. Although the various record-
ing artists comprising The Supremes changed over the years, the
group always consisted of a trio of young black women in formal
gowns and bouffant hairstyles. Motown owned the trademark to The
Supremes.
The suit arose from a Hormel television commercial for Dinty
Moore brand beef stew that featured three young black women with
bouffant hair and formal gowns singing, "Dinty Moore, My Dinty
Moore," to the tune of "Baby Love." The plaintiffs alleged that the use
of the image of The Supremes in the commercial without Motown's
permission was likely to cause confusion and create the misimpression
that Motown authorized the use of the image of The Supremes.
In holding that federal copyright law preempted plaintiffs' right
of publicity claim, the court emphasized, "Without the use of the tune
141 Produced by Charles Burrows Charles Productions.
142 Wendt, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5464, at *2-*4.
143 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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from 'Baby Love,' plaintiffs [sic] complaint would most likely be with-
out merit."144 Therefore, the right of publicity claim in the Motown
case "revolve[d] around the unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work"145 rather than the theft of an attribute of personal identity. The
Motown court recognized the limits to which its finding of preemption
could be applied by expressly stating:
The Court recognizes that § 3344 may not always be preempted by
copyright law. However, given the unique nature of plaintiffs' com-
plaint, the Court finds that the basic act which constitutes the al-
leged infringement-the unauthorized use of plaintiffs'
composition-is the same as that of copyright and is therefore
preempted. 1
46
Unlike the majority of right of publicity claims, Motown was not
brought by an individual asserting unauthorized use of his or her per-
sona. Instead, the right of publicity claim was asserted by the corpo-
rate owner of the copyright that had been copied by the defendant. 147
Since the plaintiffs owned the copyright in, and were protected by
copyright law for, the same composition that formed the basis of their
right of publicity claim, allowing recovery under the right of publicity
would have granted the plaintiffs rights "equivalent to" those of copy-
right law. Thus, the facts of Motown can be distinguished from most
right of publicity claims. Furthermore, Motown was decided without
the guidance of Midler or Waits.
The California State Court of Appeals recently found that federal
copyright law preempted the plaintiffs right of publicity claim in Fleet
v. CBS, Inc.148 In that case, Stephan Fleet and Archie Simpson, both
minors, appeared in a movie co-produced by White Dragon Produc-
tions of which Fleet's father was one of two sole shareholders. White
Dragon entered into a distribution agreement with CBS, granting CBS
144 Id. at 1240.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1240-41.
147 A discussion as to whether a corporation should be allowed a right of publicity
is beyond the scope of this Note, but I would argue that is does not for several rea-
sons. First, the right of publicity is a personal proprietary right associated with a per-
son's, not a corporate entity's, persona or likeness. The policy considerations and
rationales for publicity rights protection do not extend to such protection for corpo-
rate entities. Second, the corporate owner will be protected by trademark law for any
misappropriations that threaten to confuse the consumer as to the source of the
goods or services in question. Finally, the owner of a copyright to a performed work
will be protected by federal copyright law for any infringement of that same copy-
righted work. In that instance, state protection would be equivalent to, and therefore
preempted by, federal copyright law.
148 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1996).
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exclusive rights to distribute the motion picture.' 49 White Dragon
also entered into a separate agreement with Performance Guarantees,
Inc. to ensure that the film would be completed on time and on
budget.
150
White Dragon began principal photography for the film in Sep-
tember 1985, but Performance Guarantees stepped in to complete the
film in March 1986.151 The completion guarantor paid neither Fleet
nor Simpson for their performances, so the actors informed CBS that
they had not been compensated for their performances in the film,
and asserted that CBS therefore did not have permission to utilize
their names or likenesses in conjunction with exploitation of the film.
Nonetheless, CBS released the film on videotape under the title, Leg-
end of the White Horse, and included a picture of Stephan Fleet on the
box. Fleet and Simpson sued, stating that CBS was not authorized to
use performances of Fleet or Simpson because CBS had breached the
terms of the distribution agreement by not fully paying the actors, not
granting them credit to which they were contractually entitled on
videocassette releases of the motion picture, and redubbing all of
Fleet's speaking parts without his consent.1 52 CBS responded that it
owned the copyright pursuant to federal copyright law.'
53
The trial court granted CBS's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the actors' performances were within the subject mat-
ter of copyright protection in that they were "fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression," rendering the "rights asserted ... equivalent to
the exclusive rights of copyright."15 4 Fleet and Simpson appealed,
and the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that federal law
preempted the actors' right of publicity claims. The court stated:
We agree that as a general proposition section 3344 is intended to
protect rights which cannot be copyrighted and that claims made
under its provisions are usually not preempted. But appellants'
analysis crumbles in the face of one obvious fact: their individual
performances in the film White Dragon were copyrightable. Since
their section 3344 claims seek only to prevent CBS from reproduc-
ing and distributing their performances in the film, their claims
must be preempted by federal copyright law.
155
149 Id. at 646.
150 Id. at 647.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 648.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 650.
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The court determined that the right of publicity claims of the young
actors were "within the subject matter of copyright" since, "[t]here
can be no question that, once appellants' performances were put on
film, they became 'dramatic works' 'fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression'.' u5 6 The problem with this statement is that many ques-
tions may arise as to whether the actors' claims fell within the subject
matter of copyright. The actors did not claim that they owned an in-
terest in the copyright of the films. Rather, they sought to prevent
their names, likenesses, and identities from being used in the distribu-
tion and promotion of films in which they appeared but with whom
the distributor apparently had breached contractual duties. Just be-
cause the actors were captured on film did not render their identities
and personas fixed in a tangible form.
Assume Mel Gibson's friends throw him a birthday party, and one
of Gibson's acquaintances takes pictures of the actor. Gibson knows
he is being photographed and allows his friend to photograph him.
Gibson's friend now has photographs of the actor to which the actor
has consented. Furthermore, the friend, as the photographer, owns
the copyright to those photographs. Under the rationale of the Fleet
court, Gibson's friend could now sell T-shirts with Gibson's photo-
graph on it, or make posters of the photograph and distribute them
for the friend's personal gain simply because Gibson's identity has
been reduced to a tangible form and is protected by the copyright of
the photographer.
The Fleet court attempted to reconcile its decision with
Zacchini'57 by highlighting that the "important distinction" between
Fleet and Zacchini was that Zacchini had not consented to the taping of
the cannonball act. Two major flaws-manifest themselves in this argu-
ment. First, even if Fleet initially permitted the filming of his acting,
any contractual breach of duties owed by CBS to Fleet renders the
broken contract the equivalent of Fleet not consenting to the reduc-
tion of his likeness to a copyrightable, tangible form. Second, even if
an actor consents to the filming, photographing, drawing or any other
reduction of his performance to a tangible form, this does not provide
blanket consent for the "author" of the reduced "writing" to exploit
the actor's identity however he sees fit. Such a misinterpretation of
the law would lead to a situation akin to the Mel Gibson birthday
photo hypothetical. Other commentators have stated the same. 158
156 Id.
157 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
158 See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMmER, supra note 88, § 1.01 [b] [1] [c], at 1-22 to -23.
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The Fleet court justified its opinion that Fleet's right of publicity
claim was the equivalent of copyright based on CBS's proposed use of
the film. 159 The court stated, "CBS seeks to display or reproduce
those images and no others. The owner of a copyright-either the
'author' (actor) or his employer (the producer)-is vested with the
exclusive rights to, among other things, 'reproduce the copyrighted
work' and 'display the copyrighted work publicly."'"
60
This argument, specious for the same reasons as the Mel Gibson
birthday photograph hypothetical, ignores the fact that a copyright
owner has exclusive rights under federal copyright law only if the pro-
posed state rights are equivalent to the rights afforded by federal copy-
right laws. The publicity rights that adhere to a person's persona are
not tangible, and simply taking a picture or filming a person in an act
does not grant the photographer exclusive rights to the use of the
work if that use infringes on the publicity rights of the celebrity; rights
which require proving elements in addition to, and apart from, those
required of copyright infringement.
Similarly, unauthorized photographs might be copyrightable, but
the person photographed might object to distribution under the right
of privacy. The Fleet court attempts to rectify its decision with scena-
rios similar to the Mel Gibson hypothetical by claiming, "[a] n actor
who wishes to protect the use of the image contained in a single, fixed
dramatic performance need simply retain the copyright.1 61 This
statement presents an egregious example of injustice and epitomizes
the reason that artists deserve to have their interests protected from
those who wish to exploit their identities for commercial gain. Only a
handful of actors can afford to purchase the copyrights to their
works162 or to actually produce their current projects, 163 and even
159 Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 651.
162 Telephone Interview with Vicki Shapiro, Attorney for Screen Actors Guild
(Mar. 28, 1997).
163 Only the most established actors have their own production companies with
studio deals. A few of them are: Alec Baldwin (El Dorado), Nicholas Cage (Saturn),
Sean Connery (Fountainbridge), Tom Cruise (C/W), Billy Crystal (Face), Robert De
Niro (Tribeca), Danny DeVito (Jersey), Michael Douglas (Douglas/Reuther), Jodie
Foster (Egg), Mel Gibson (Icon), Diane Keaton (Blue Relief), Michael Keaton
(Colomby/Keaton), Harvey Keitel (Goatsingers), Martin Lawrence (You Go Boy), Ma-
donna (Maverick), Bette Midler (All Girls), Eddie Murphy (Eddie Murphy), Michelle
Pfieffer (Via Rosa), Bill Pullman (Big Town), Tim Robbins (Havoc), Daniel Stem
(Chesapeake), Alicia Silverstone (First Kiss), Michael Stipe (Single Cell), Barbra
Streisand (Barwood), Quentin Tarantino (A Band Apart), Robin Williams (Blue
Wolf), Bruce Willis (Flying Heart). 29 HOLLYWOOD CREATIVE DIRECTORY (Feb. 1996).
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though they may be so fortunate now, chances are they were not ear-
lier in their careers.1
64
For example, Mel Gibson might be able to afford an interest in
his current projects, 165 yet he certainly could not have afforded the
copyright to earlier acting forays like Mad Max.166 Unlike well-paid
attorneys or judges, the struggling actor can hardly afford the gas to
get to his audition, much less the money to purchase a copyright in
his performance. It is no more reasonable to assume that an actor can
purchase the copyright to his performance than it is to assume that a
young model can afford to purchase the diamond tiara that graces her
neck for a one-day photo shoot. To reason that they could would re-
sult in virtually no actor having publicity rights protection for his or
her identity as personified early in the artist's career.
The Fleet court then relied on the Seventh Circuit Court's deci-
sion in Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Association
167
and even cited the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, "[b]y virtue of being
videotaped... the Players' performances are fixed in tangible form,
and any rights of publicity in their performances that are equivalent to
the rights contained in the copyright of the telecast are pre-
empted." 6 This statement is correct, but incorrectly applied.
True, if the rights of publicity are equivalent to the rights af-
forded by copyright, those rights will be preempted. Of importance
in the instance of right of publicity, however, is that the right of pub-
licity, even if reduced to a tangible form, is not equivalent to copyright
since it requires proving the additional elements of the plaintiff's rec-
ognizable identity or use for the defendant's commercial advantage.
Although these artists are currently established enough to purchase a proprietary
interest in some of their projects, they certainly were not so fortunate early in their
careers. For example, Brad Pitt is currently an internationally recognizable name
while James Marsden, the star of MGM's Disturbing Behavior, is relatively unknown.
Nonetheless, in just a few years time, the pecuniary value of Marsden's identity could
very well eclipse that of Pitt's.
164 Just because Tom Cruise's C/W Productions could afford to produce Mission
Impossible in 1996 does not mean that Cruise could have purchased the copyright to
Risky Business in 1983, yet that is precisely the position championed by the Fleet court
and others espousing the viewpoint of "just have the talent buy the copyright." This
reasoning would result in almost no artist having a publicity right in his or her idenity
as personified early in the performer's career.
165 Mel Gibson's Icon Productions produced his Academy Award winning film
Braveheart. BRAvEHEART (Paramount Pictures 1995).
166 MAD MAx (Crossroads International Finance 1979).
167 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986); see infra Part V(C).
168 Fleetv. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 652 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Orioles, 805
F.2d at 675).
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Rulings such as Fleet which find that the right of publicity is pre-
empted constitute a dangerous precedent. On the other hand, the
facts of Fleet potentially address only the scenario of actual reproduc-
tion, performance, and display of the film according to CBS's distribu-
tion agreement. If CBS did not violate terms of contracts with Fleet,
the court is correct in holding that when the artist consents to a par-
ticular use of his identity in a copyrightable form, the resulting holder
of that copyright cannot be deterred from exercising the exclusive
rights of his copyright by any state law such as the right of publicity.
The briefs of both parties in the Astaire169 case discussed Fleet, so the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case could have at once discussed
Fleet's limitations, limited Motown to its facts, and provided a concrete
approach of the Ninth Circuit on the preemption issue.
C. Courts Outside California and the Ninth Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held that federal
copyright law did not preempt state right of publicity laws in Factors,
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.170 The issue before the court was whether
Elvis Presley's right of publicity was devisable. In that case, Elvis Pres-
ley had established Boxcar Enterprises, Inc., a Tennessee corporation,
and assigned to it exclusive ownership of all rights to his name and
likeness for commercial purposes. 171 Two days after Presley's death,
Boxcar granted an exclusive license to use Presley's name and likeness
to Factors, Etc., a Delaware corporation, and the next day, Pro Arts,
Inc., an Ohio corporation, published a poster of Presley. Pro Arts had
purchased the copyright in the photograph from a newspaper photog-
rapher who had taken it.
The Second Circuit Court reversed the lower court ruling on
other grounds, 1 72 so the majority opinion expressly refused to address
169 Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
170 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
171 Id.
172 In the first part of the litigation, the Second Circuit Court affirmed Factors'
injunction against Pro Arts. Nonetheless, contemporaneously with the initiation of
the suit against Factors, the Memphis Development Corporation sued Factors in the
Western District of Tennessee to prevent Factors from interfering with the founda-
tion's fundraising efforts by which they used pewter replicas of the proposed Presley
statue. The Sixth Circuit held that Presley's right of publicity did not survive his
death. Then, when Factors moved for summary judgment in the New York litigation
against Pro Arts, Pro Arts brought the Sixth Circuit's ruling to the attention of the
District Court and asserted that the holding estopped Factors from claiming it had
any exclusive publicity rights to the name and likeness of Presley after his death. The
Second Circuit Court deferred to the views of the Sixth Circuit and concluded that
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the issue of preemption. 173 Nonetheless, Judge Mansfield's dissent
addressed the issue. He agreed with the exhaustive discussion and
conclusion of Judge Tenney' 74 of the district court
that the right protected here is not equivalent to any within the gen-
eral scope of federal copyright law and so is not preempted by the
1909 Act, as interpreted in Goldstein .... It would likewise not have
been preempted under § 301 of the new 1976 Act... if the events
had occurred after 1978.175
Judge Mansfield continued:
The right of publicity protects an interest which copyright does not.
That interest is the individual's ability commercially to maintain and
exploit his fame and persona. Copyright merely protects the holder
from the taking of specific expressions or arrangements he or she
had created. The right of publicity, on the other hand, protects
against the unauthorized appropriation of an individual's very per-
sona which would result in unearned commercial gain to another.
If this right is not the equivalent of a copyright interest... (as Pro
Arts concedes) it is equally not the equivalent after he has died and
it has been devised. Other courts which have considered the pre-
emption argument in this exact context have reached the same con-
clusion as that arrived at by the district court here.'
7 6
Thus, although the majority opinion of the Second Circuit did not
address the preemption issue, Justice Mansfield's dissent and refer-
ence to the district court's elaborate discussion of the issue indicated
that congressional action had not preempted the recognition of the
common law right of publicity.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that federal copyright law did not preempt the right of publicity
in Bi-Rite Enterprises v. Button Master.'7 7 In that case, the manufacturer
after Presley's death, Boxcar had no right of publicity in Presley's name and likeness
to convey to Factors. See id. at 283.
173 See id. 'at 283 n.8 ("In view of our disposition of the appeal .. .we need not
consider Pro Arts' other contentions, which include... [whether] federal copyright
law preempts application of state law purporting to protect such a right [of
publicity].").
174 Id. at 289 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing Factors Etc., Inc v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
496 F. Supp. 1090, 1095-1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
Judge Tenney's opinion includes an in depth discussion of potential preemption and
concludes that the 1976 Act was not intended to preempt the right of publicity.
175 See Factors, Etc., 652 F.2d at 289 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 448 (Cal. 1979) (Bird,
CJ., dissenting) and Apigram Publ'g Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., Civ. No. C78-525, 1980
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9738 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 1980).
177 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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and distributor of posters, buttons, patches, and novelty items joined
several performers 78 in suing defendants who were selling unlicensed
buttons bearing the logos and likenesses of the plaintiffs. The district
court applied the law of the states in which the individual plaintiffs or
their exclusive licensees resided, 179 so California, Illinois, and Georgia
right of publicity laws were applied to the plaintiffs' claims, depending
on their states of residence.
180
The court recognized that the right of publicity existed in all
three states,18' defined the right of publicity generally to grant a per-
son an exclusive right to control the commercial value of his name
and likeness and to prevent others from exploiting that value without
permission, 182 and concluded that federal copyright law did not pre-
empt the plaintiffs' right of publicity claims. In holding that the right
of publicity was not preempted, the court stated:
The right of publicity therefore grants plaintiffs relief where none
exists under federal law. Federal preemption poses no bar to such
relief. "The intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of
publicity simply does not constitute a writing," . . . and therefore
falls outside of the preemption standards established by Congress in
the copyright law .. .183
178 Id. at 1191 ("The plaintiffs also include several rock groups-Judas Priest,
Molly Hatchett, Devo, Styx, and Iron Maiden-their individual members, and two
solo performers, Neil Young, and Pat Benatar.").
179 Id. at 1197 (citing Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319
(2d Cir. 1982) ("A New York court, considering a right of publicity case, would apply
its property choice-of-law rules to select the state whose law determines whether a
plaintiff has a protectible right of publicity.")).
180 Id. ("Plaintiffs Pat Benatar, Neil Young and members of the group Devo, plus
their managers or licensees all reside in California .... Accordingly the situs of these
plaintiffs' proprietary publicity interest is California .... Bi-Rite, an Illinois corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Illinois, is also subject to Illinois Law.").
181 Id. at 1198 (citing Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201,
1213-14 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979);
McQueen v. Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 162 S.E.2d
313 (Ga. 1968); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc.,
327 N.E.2d 242, 245 (111. App. Ct. 1975)).
182 Id. (citing Martin Luther KingJr., Center for Soc. Change, Inc., 508 F. Supp. at 862;
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 (Bird, CJ., dissenting)).
183 Bi-Rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 448 (Bird, CJ., dis-
senting) and citing 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836,
842-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
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Thus, as Factors and Bi-Rite indicate, Second Circuit courts share the
opinion of the Ninth Circuit that federal copyright law does not pre-
empt a state's right of publicity law. Despite the established holdings
of the United States Supreme Court and several circuit and state
courts, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that federal
copyright law preempts the right of publicity.' 84 That court's conclu-
sions were influenced by the fact that many aspects of what makes a
person a public figure can be captured in media such as film or tape
which are eligible for copyright protection. Since an individual's per-
sona may be "fixed in any tangible means of expression,"'18 5 the right
of publicity protecting these copyrightable interests is preempted by
federal copyright. 186
The reasoning that part of a persona may be captured in copy-
rightable media was relied upon in Baltimore Orioles v. Major League
Baseball Players Association187 in which professional baseball players
sued major league franchises for using their identities to promote the
franchise by broadcasting current games. Although the clubs owned
the copyright to the telecasts of the games, the players claimed that
broadcasts of the games made without their express consent violated
their rights of publicity in their performances.18 8 The Seventh Circuit
held that the clubs' copyright in the telecasts of major league games
preempted the players' rights of publicity. 8 9 The court also held that
a baseball game was a protectible work of authorship. 190
This erroneous conclusion has received a lot of criticism' 9'
since sporting events are not original works of authorship under
184 See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663
(7th Cir. 1986).
185 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
186 See Orioles, 805 F.2d at 677 (finding that baseball players' personae "are fixed in
tangible form and come within the subject of copyright); see generally Shipley, supra
note 13, at 701-23 (stating that to provide for the continuing vitality of the publicity
doctrine, courts must construe state law publicity rights in the context of the current
federal copyright law).
187 Orioes, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. (stating that players' performances contain the modest creativity required
for copyrightability).
191 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 88, § 2.09[F] at 2-170 ("[A]thletic events
are subject to legal protection pursuant only to right of publicity, misappropriation,
and other established legal doctrines outside the ambit of statutory copyright."); see
also Fleet v. CBS, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 652 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The Seventh Circuit
decided that a baseball game or other sporting event was a creative work of author-
ship. We can well understand why that conclusion has given rise to much controversy
among the commentators and express no opinion as to its correctness.").
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§ 102.192 Although there may be an underlying coach's book or game
plan, sporting events are not "authored" since there is no underlying
script or other expression reduceable to a tangible form.193 There-
fore, sporting events do not fall within the subject matter of copyright
and are not copyrightable. 94 On the other hand, broadcasts of sport-
ing events, as opposed to the events themselves, are entitled to copy-
right protection. 195
The court continued by stating that once a performance is re-
duced to a tangible form by being taped, no distinction exists between
the performance and the recording of the performance for the pur-
poses of preemption.196
192 § 102 lists the eight categories of authorship as follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
193 See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Sports events are not 'authored' in any common sense of the word. There is, of
course ... considerable preparation for a game. However, the preparation is as much
an expression of hope or faith as a determination of what will actually happen. Unlike
movies, plays, television programs, or operas, athletic events are competitive and have
no underlying script.").
194 See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 88, § 2.09 [F] at 2-170 (stating that the "far
more reasonable" position is that athletic events are not copyrightable).
195 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that
are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is
being made simultaneously with its transmission."); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 ("When a football game is being
covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding the activity of the four
cameraman and choosing which of their electronic images are sent out to the public
and in what order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are
doing constitutes 'authorship.'").
196 The court stated that the telecasts were fixed in a tangible form because they
were recorded simultaneously with their transmission and were audiovisual works
which come within the subject matter of copyright. The major flaw in this reasoning
stems from the fact that the works in which the Players' rights of publicity subsist are
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Thus, if a baseball game were not broadcast or were telecast with-
out being recorded, the players' performances similarly would not be
fixed in a tangible form and their rights of publicity would not be
subject to preemption. By virtue of being videotaped, however, the
players' performances are fixed in a tangible form, and any rights of
publicity in their performances that are equivalent to the rights con-
tained in the copyright of the telecast are preempted. 197 It is true that
the telecasts were fixed in a tangible form, but the players' personas
were not.
Holding that one sacrifices publicity rights in his persona simply
because his image was fixed in tangible medium threatens the right of
publicity of celebrities who, by the very nature of their work, are al-
most always captured on film, tape, or some other medium. An indi-
vidual's likeness and persona are intangible property rights, distinct
from those rights protected by the copyright of a tangible work. The
court's definition of equivalence involved evaluating the interests pro-
tected by the right of publicity and the copyright statute, as well as the
elements of the causes of action.198
The court declared that the purposes of the right of publicity and
copyright were similar, namely to benefit the public by inducing indi-
viduals to undertake the personal sacrifices necessary to create works
and promote performances of interest to the public.' 99
Although motivating individuals to create original works is a simi-
larity between the policies of copyright and publicity rights, protection
provided by the right of publicity protects the intangible personas of
individuals and often extends beyond what copyright protection can
offer.200 The purpose of copyright is to allow the individual creator a
temporary monopoly over the subject matter of his or her tangible
creation while the right of publicity, on the other hand, exceeds that
by granting the creative individual an ownership interest in his or her
intangible name, likeness, or identity. Thus, the goals and purposes
are indeed similar, but they are not equivalent. The Orioles court sum-
the actual performances of the game, and those performances per se are not fixed in
a tangible form. See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 16.
197 See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 675 (1987).
198 Id. The court then stated that a state "right is equivalent to copyright if (1) it is
infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display or
(2) it requires additional elements to make out the cause of action, but the additional
elements do not differ in kind from those necessary for copyright .... " Id. at 678
n.26.
199 Id. at 678-79.
200 See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the
right of publicity is "intended to protect rights which cannot be copyrighted").
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marily dismissed the guidance of Zacchini, Bi-Rite, Bird's dissent in Lu-
gosi, and Mansfield's dissent in Factors by stating:
Each opinion is premised upon an erroneous analysis of preemp-
tion... [since they] assert without discussion that the right of pub-
licity is not preempted because the work that it protects-a public
figure's persona-cannot be fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. We disagree. Because a performance is fixed in a tangible
form when it is recorded, a right of publicity in a performance that
has been reduced to a tangible form is subject to preemption.
201
This reasoning is subject to the same limitations as those discussed
above 202 in response to Fleet, which cites Orioles.20 3 Under this view of
the law, the right of publicity could never be asserted based on a de-
fendant's unauthorized use of a celebrity's persona as originally por-
trayed in a film or other copyrightable work, no matter how
commercial the use. A defendant would be free to use film and tape
clips or photographs of famous actors or actresses to produce adver-
tisements for consumer goods, to adorn T-shirts and coffee mugs, or
for any other concededly commercial purpose, merely because the
medium in which the likeness originally appeared was itself the sub-
ject of copyright.
It might be argued that the poor decision of the Seventh Circuit
can be limited to a factual situation where:
1. The performers are employees of the franchise;
2. The participation in the televised games were within the scope of
the performer's employment and therefore were works for hire
under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); and
3. The copyrights were owned by the respective franchises.
20 4
Unfortunately, the expansive reach of the Orioles decision has in-
fluenced not only subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions20 5 in which it
was mandatory, but a California State Court of Appeal20 6 and possibly
an Eighth Circuit decision as well.
20 7
In the unpublished decision of Brode v. Tax Management, Inc.,20 8
the plaintiff contended that by using his name in connection with a
portfolio he authored that was distributed through the LEXIS
201 Orioes, 805 F.2d at 678 n.26.
202 See infra Part IV(C) of this Note.
203 See Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652.
204 Elliott, supra note 35, at 605.
205 See Brode v. Tax Management, Inc. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 998 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 31,
1990).
206 See Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
207 See Ventura v. Titan Sports, 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
208 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 998 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1990).
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database, defendants commercially exploited his name and thereby
violated his right of publicity. The district court held that the public-
ity claim was preempted by federal copyright statute.20 9 The court dis-
missed Zacchini, Bi-Rite, Bird's dissent in Lugosi, and Mansfield's
dissent in Factors, and quoted the Orioles court for the presumption
that "[b]ecause the right of publicity does not require a qualitatively
different additional element, it is equivalent to a copyright and is pre-
empted to the extent that it is claimed in a tangible work within the
subject matter of copyright."210 The court then concluded that the
"plaintiff cannot point to an element in the right of publicity claim
which is qualitatively different from the copyright infringement."21'
As applied to this scenario where the plaintiff was both the copy-
right owner and the performer, that statement might hold true since
the plaintiff could exercise his copyright to remedy himself for unau-
thorized use.212 Brode was an unpublished decision and involved a
plaintiff who held both the copyright in the work and rights in his
publicity. Therefore, its influence is limited, but of note is the sweep-
ing adoption of the Orioles court's reasoning and the dismissal or ab-
sence of other preemption evaluations.
The Orioles holding of copyright preemption was mentioned in a
recent district court decision within the Seventh Circuit in Pesina v.
Midway Manufacturers Co.2 13 Pesina, a martial arts expert, had his
movements videotaped, captured by a computer, extensively edited,
and incorporated in the defendant's video games of Mortal Kombat,
Mortal Kombat II, and related products as the fictional character of
Johnny Cage.214 Although the plaintiff's identity was severely altered
by the time it got to the screen of the video games, 215 he sued for the
unconsented use of his name, persona, and likeness in the home ver-
sion of the video games.
The court found that the defendants did not violate Pesina's right
of publicity since he could not prove two elements under Illinois right
209 Id. at *21.
210 Id. at *27 (quoting Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (1987)).
211 Id.
212 It is possible to have equivalent rights and elements in this situation, with the
possible exception that the right of publicity requires showing infringement for the
commercial advantage of the defendant, and that the plaintiff might enjoy more ex-
tensive remedies under right of publicity laws.
213 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
214 Id. at 42.
215 Id. at 42 ("[A]fter comparing Mr. Pesina and the game character, Johnny
Cage, who allegedly resembles the plaintiff, only 6% of 306 Mortal Kombat users iden-
tified Mr. Pesina as the model.").
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of publicity law: (1) his identity had a commercial value and (2) his
likeness was recognizable in the unauthorized use. The particular
holding in this case is not nearly as important as the footnote in which
the court addresses preemption and limits the application of Orioles to
a specific set of facts. The court responded to Orioles by stating,
" [t] his Circuit has suggested that if an employee has contractually lim-
ited the media in which his performance may be shown by the em-
ployer, should the employer exceed this authority, the employee's
right of publicity claim is not preempted." 216 Thus, although men-
tioned only in passing in a footnote, courts within the Seventh Circuit
are at least willing to entertain limiting the Orioles holding to instances
involving employer/employee relationships.
Despite this potential modification of Orioles within the Seventh
Circuit, the Orioles decision resulted in misguided dicta contained in a
footnote of an Eighth Circuit decision in Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc.2 17
Professional wrestler and entertainer Jesse "The Body" Ventura
claimed that Titan Sports, which operates "The World Wresting Fed-
eration" (WWF) for whom Ventura commentates, infringed on Ven-
tura's right of publicity by using his likeness, beyond what he claimed
he had contractually agreed, on videotapes produced by Titan
Sports.218
The court held that although Minnesota does not recognize the
four-fold tort of invasion of privacy, "the Minnesota Supreme Court
would recognize the tort of violation of publicity rights. '219 The
Eighth Circuit then upheld the district court's holding in favor of
Ventura for the exploitation of his commentating performances.
Of importance to this decision is not so much the holding of the
court, but rather a footnoted discussion of preemption where the
Eighth Circuit cited only Orioles. In a footnote the court states, "[w] e
are troubled by the fact that section 301 (a) of the copyright code (Ti-
tle 17) preempts Ventura's claims that are 'equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106,' such as the production of videotapes of Ventura's tele-
vised commentary. '" 220 Although reproduction and display are rights
under § 106(1) and (5) respectively, and unauthorized reproduction
or display would infringe upon the owner's copyright, Ventura did not
own the copyright to the work, so copyright law would not provide
216 Id. at 42 n.3 (citing Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663, 679 n.29 (7th Cir. 1986)).
217 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
218 Id. at 728, 730.
219 Id. at 730.
220 Id. at 730 n.6 (citing Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675).
1664 [VOL. 73:5
1998] THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 1665
Ventura with relief. Furthermore, since the right of publicity would
require Ventura to prove extra elements such as injury to his intangi-
ble persona, the state right would not be equivalent to federal copy-
right law.
The court cited Orioles for the presumption of preemption but
ruled that since Titan Sports failed to timely raise the preemption de-
fense on appeal, the preemption issue became moot.221 The fact that
preemption was not an issue, coupled with the cursory treatment in
which the court needed only to address the issue in dicta in a foot-
note, suggests that a more elaborate discussion of the issue by the
Eighth Circuit could hold that federal copyright law does not preempt
the right of publicity. Nonetheless, the manner in which the court
cited only the Orioles holding of preemption, to the noticeable exclu-
sion of Ninth Circuit, Second Circuit, and United States Supreme
Court decisions, is of note.
D. Application to Facts ofAstaire v. Best Film & Video
In Astaire v. Best Film & Video,222 which was recently decided by
the Ninth Circuit on issues other than federal preemption, the widow
of Fred Astaire sought to enjoin a video production company from
violating her husband's right of publicity. 223 The defendant, Best
Film & Video, argued, among other things, that Astaire's right of pub-
licity claim was preempted by federal copyright law.2 24 Best based its
preemption argument on a broad reading of Sears and Compco, with-
out citing Goldstein's or Waits'language, limiting the Sears and Compco
line of cases. 22
5
Because the films from which the clips were taken were the
proper subject of copyright 226 and had fallen into the public domain,
Best erroneously concluded, "so long as that use involved only dupli-
221 The Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the preemption defenses begs the question of
whether federal preemption is an affirmative defense or indeed able to be waived.
222 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
223 Robyn Astaire also holds the right to Fred Astaire's name, voice, photograph,
and likeness under CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1998).
224 Facts of Astaire are detailed in supra Part II(B) of this Note.
225 Sears and Compco are discussed in supra Part II(B) of this Note. See 4 NIMMFR
& NIMMER, supra note 88, §16.04[C], at 16-29 (1997) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Gold-
stein v. California, held that Sears-Compcojustifies federal preemption only in the pat-
ent, not in the copyright sphere.") (citations omitted); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting assertion that the Supreme Court has
"endorse[d] or resurrect[ed] the broad reading of Compco and Sears urged by
defendants").
226 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
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cation and incorporation into another work, no one but the copyright
holder would have the right to authorize or refuse to authorize such a
use."
227
The problem with this statement is that the right of the copyright
holder refers to the owner's right in the tangibly reduced expression.
It does not mean that the copyright holder can then use the work in a
manner infringing on the celebrity's publicity rights which protect the
intangible persona of the individual.
For example, if a producer owns the copyright to four episodes of
In Living Color,228 that does not mean that he can incorporate an hour
ofJim Carrey's performances into another work, such as a commercial
for vacuum cleaners. Put another way, the producer needs the per-
former's permission to make such a use of his identity, regardless of
whether the producer or anybody else owns the copyright to the per-
formance. It also does not mean that the producer can make a "How
to Make People Laugh" video and then, in attempting to sell the cas-
settes to distributors, insert a minute and a half ofJim Carrey's rubber-
faced comedy routines into the cassettes without Carrey's permission.
Granting exclusive rights to the copyright holder at the expense of the
celebrity would allow any producer or distributor to simply edit and
mix his film stock of a certain celebrity and incorporate that celeb-
rity's identity and image into the producer's future works, regardless
of whether the celebrity consents.
In responding to defendant's reasoning on this issue, the district
court correctly concluded that California's right of publicity prohibits
the use of film excerpts that include the image and likeness of a celeb-
rity who has not consented to such a use. Best responded that this
holding places California's right of publicity law
on a collision course with the Copyright Act. If it is entirely lawful
to duplicate public domain film clips of Fred Astaire and incorpo-
rate them into another work under federal copyright law (which it
is), state law cannot render the same duplication and use a misap-
propriation unless consent is obtained.
2 2 9
Best erroneously maintained, "Since any copy or derivative of copy-
rightable material that includes a celebrity likeness will necessarily in-
volve the use of the likeness on a product, such a claim, where the
227 Appellant's Opening Brief at 22, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
228 Produced by Ivory Way Productions. This television variety program was origi-
nally aired on Fox. It featured the abilities of many now-famous artists, includingJim
Carrey, Damon Wayans, Jennifer Lopez, and many other talented individuals.
229 Appellant's Opening Brief at 23, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
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likeness used is the subject of copyright, is tantamount to a claim of
copying, and is therefore preempted."
230
This argument fails because it would yield the devastating result
that celebrities would sacrifice their publicity rights in anything to
which another, or the public, owns the copyright. This would com-
pletely eliminate the rights actors have in their hard-earned personas
and images since the producer or distributor who owns the copyright
could use the work in any manner he or she desires, regardless of how
it impacts the celebrity's likeness. Best attempted to distinguish Waits
and Midler as controlling only where there is a false endorsement.
231
Best argued:
Were the Court to allow the right of publicity to be expanded as
Astaire suggests, the preemption doctrine itself would be swallowed
whole so long as the materials subject to copyright contain any iden-
tifiable individual. Under the lower court's ruling, if an individual
is depicted in a work subject to copyright, then a publicity rights
claim would lie, regardless of who owns the copyright or if the work
has fallen under the public domain, and no matter what context the
use occurs. In effect, the rule would grant the individual depicted
or his estate possess [sic] a compulsory license right on the use of
the material subject to copyright and the concomitant ability to pre-
vent its reproduction entirely. Any time that film clips (whether
copyrighted or public domain) are used'in any context, there would
be the potential for a publicity rights claim from any individual de-
picted in those film clips .... If the Court adopts the ruling Astaire
urges, and allows publicity rights claims even in the absence of a
false endorsement found in Waits and Midler and the other cases
Astaire cites, celebrities will in effect step into the shoes of the copy-
right holder, being able to control when and where film clips can be
reproduced. A clearer collision course with the exclusive provisions
of the Copyright Act cannot be envisioned.
23 2
This specious argument fails to recognize that the correct focus is not
whether Best's use constitutes a "false endorsement," but whether the
right of publicity in Fred Astaire's likeness falls within the subject mat-
ter of copyright. Like the voices in Midler and Waits, the likeness of
Fred Astaire is intangible. Even though a likeness and voice can be
embodied in a tangible work, it is the personal attribute itself, not the
tangible embodiment of it, that is protected by the right of publicity.
230 Id. at 26 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th
Cir. 1970) and Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 (Ct. App.
1982)).
231 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 24, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
232 Id. at 24-25.
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Astaire correctly responded that a state right of publicity claim is
not equivalent to federal copyright since it contains elements that are
different in kind from copyright. 23 3 For example, § 990 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code adds the element of proving that the individual whose
persona has been misappropriated be someone whose identity has
commercial value at the time of his or her death,234 whereas a claim
for copyright infringement is established merely by proving unauthor-
ized copying, regardless of whether the subject of the copyrighted
work has independent commercial value.
23 5
Astaire further emphasized that, as Midler and Waits make clear,
"the right of publicity coexists in perfect harmony with copyright pro-
tection, because each protects different intangible rights." 23 6 Whereas
federal copyright law protects works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, the right of publicity, by contrast, pro-
tects various attributes of an individual's identity. Since it is the unau-
thorized use of the individual's identity, regardless of the medium in
which the misappropriated attribute happens to appear, that consti-
tutes a right of publicity violation, federal copyright law is not
equivalent to, and therefore does not preempt the right of publicity
which protects different rights entirely.
The Astaire case was decided on grounds apart from the federal
preemption issue, so this case did not provide the appropriate circum-
stances and events for definitively determining whether federal copy-
right law preempts a state's right of publicity. Nonetheless, as
evidenced by the incongruous body of decisions addressing this issue,
it is imperative that either the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme
Court decide a case on the merits of this issue and hold that state right
of publicity laws are distinct from, and immune from preemption by,
the Federal Copyright Act of 1976. Such a finding, coupled with a
detailed analysis in a published decision, would provide the consis-
tency and guidance that courts require in deciding this issue. It also
233 See id. at 29; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5748 (stating that a state law cause of action is not "equivalent" to the rights created
by the Copyright Act, and is therefore not preempted, if it "contain[s] ele-
ments .. . that are different in kind from copyright infringement")).
234 CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(h) (West 1998) (stating that the individual whose per-
sona has been misappropriated must be someone whose "name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death").
235 See Respondent's Opening Brief at 30, Astaire (No. 95-56632) (citing CAL. CIv.
CODE § 990 and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (finding no copyright preemption where plaintiff was required to prove com-
mercial exploitation of name or likeness during celebrity's lifetime)).
236 Respondent's Opening Brief at 28, Astaire (No. 95-56632).
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would provide a backdrop against which courts could conclude that
the right of publicity is not preempted by federal copyright law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal copyright law does not preempt the right of publicity be-
cause (1) a person's identity is neither a "work of authorship" nor
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression," (2) identity is not a
protectible expression, thus extending beyond the general scope of
subject matter protected by copyright, and (3) the right of publicity is
not equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright since the right of
publicity, in addition to being infringed by reproduction, distribution,
or display, requires extra elements such as the defendant knowingly
using the plaintiffs intangible identity for a commercial advantage
and profiting by injuring the plaintiff's publicly recognizable persona.
Initially developed to protect the celebrity's proprietary interest
in his or her name, image, and likeness, the right of publicity has ex-
panded to cover persona and evocation-of-identity. Nonetheless, pro-
tecting an individual's persona and identity still differs from federal
copyright law which grants a creator a temporary monopoly over the
subject matter of his or her tangible creation in order to foster inven-
tions and ingenuity. The right of publicity exceeds that by granting
the creative individual an ownership interest in his or her intangible
name, likeness, or identity. Thus, since the right of publicity exists to
protect the intangible image and persona of an individual from un-
consented exploitation whereas copyright law protects the different
interest in the actual creation that has been reduced to a tangible
form, the goals and protections are similar, but not equivalent.
Holding that individuals sacrifice publicity rights in their per-
sonas simply because their images become fixed in tangible media
threatens the right of publicity of celebrities who, by the very nature of
their work, are almost always captured on film, tape, or some other
medium. An individual's likeness and persona are intangible prop-
erty rights, distinct from those rights protected by the copyright of a
tangible work. Furthermore, the right of publicity, even if reduced to
a tangible form, is not equivalent to copyright since it requires prov-
ing the additional elements of the plaintiffs recognizable identity or
use for the defendant's commercial advantage. Celebrities do not
have the right to prevent anyone from copying films in which they
appear but do not own under copyright law. What the copying party
cannot do is exploit the commercial value of the celebrity's likeness to
attract customers' attention and enhance the marketability of a prod-
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uct that does not convey newsworthy, biographical, or fictional infor-
mation about the celebrity.
The road to celebrity status is paved with humiliation, sacrifice,
and self-doubt. Artists cradle hidden notions of the greatness they
strive to achieve. Be they driven by fame or critical acclaim, trapped
deep inside them is some unfathomable vision or impulse, screaming
to be expressed. Getting even the opportunity to express their abili-
ties requires enduring chilling auditions, humiliating cattle calls,
money-consumed business minds, and an almost impenetrable road
block of other obstacles.
If the fortunate artist becomes one of the few to realize his
dreams, express her talents, or attain a marketable identity, the new-
found celebrity deserves exclusive control of his or her publicity
rights. Otherwise, individuals are relegated to watching without rem-
edy as their identities and personas are used against their will for the
undeserved advantage of another.
Furthermore, celebrity status does not die with the performer.
To the contrary, a star's light often glows brighter after the performer
passes away. Often we are left only with memories of the celebrity's
persona and identity and the way the performer caused us to laugh,
cry, or watch in awe. The star of our deceased performers deserves
protection from the tarnishing touch of those who might attempt to
exploit the persona for commercial gain. The best way to provide this
protection is to allow a devisable right of publicity that is not pre-
empted by federal copyright law.
Since celebrities spend time, money, and energy developing com-
mercially lucrative identities, such personas are the fruit of their la-
bors and deserve the protection, security, and other advantages,
economic or otherwise, provided by the right of publicity. Consider-
ing the inconsistent treatment of the preemption issue by courts
throughout the country, federal legislative action should be taken to
provide consistent protection of publicity rights. Amending § 301 of
the 1976 Copyright Act to expressly state that federal copyright law
does not preempt the state right of publicity would ensure that a ce-
lebrity is neither left without remedy for the unconsented use of his
persona nor stripped of his or her identity-the one thing no person
should ever lose.
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